Judgement versus Data
Marketplace, a public radio program, has been covering Wealth and Poverty issues on its programs for several months. On July 26th, a segment titled “Arthur Laffer on income inequality, raising taxes” was broadcast. The audio can be downloaded here. Following is an excerpt from the transcript:
Horwich: Many economists will say the data is extremely inconclusive in practice as to how marginal tax changes actually affect personal and business activity. What makes you so sure?
Laffer: Because basically, these economists you talk about never worked in the real world. They’re just looking at the econometrics and the data there. If you ever go and look at what’s being recommended from the CPA firms, from financial planners. If you actually look at how they go through, do their tax returns — believe me, they are more focused on their taxes than you and I are on their taxes.
Horwich: But am I right that I just heard you criticize economists for actually looking at the data and making their decisions based on that?
Laffer: No, no, not looking at the data. I think it’s wonderful to look at the data. But I think it’s really silly to look at this accurate data and not make any judgments beyond those aggregate data
I was especially struck by this last statement about judgment versus data. It sounded to me that Laffer has made the judgment to ignore the data! The whole point of carefully measuring the data is to test your judgments. I agree that taxes likely have an effect on individual behavior, prompting less effort at working and more effort at avoidance/evasion. However, who is to say how large these effects are and whether there are any counter effects? In this post, I quote page 115 of the book The Coming Generational Storm, co-written by economist Laurence Kotlikoff which states:
…For tax cuts to raise revenues, pretax labor earnings have to rise by a larger percentage than the tax rate falls.
There are two competing forces at play in determining whether pretax earning rise, stay the same, or fall. On the one hand, workers may say to themselves, “Boy, now that taxes are lower, I can work less and still receive the same after tax pay. I’m going to cut back my workweek.” On the other hand, they may say, “Boy, now’s a good time to work more and earn more because taxes are lower on every extra dollar I earn”. Economists call the first of these reactions the income effect. They call the second reaction, the substitution or incentive effect.
Some of the best labor economists in the country have spent their lifetimes measuring the income and substitution effects. The broad consensus of these experts is that the two effects are roughly offsetting. This means that if wage tax rates are cut by, say 15 percent, tax revenues will fall by 15 percent.
Only by looking carefully at all of the data can one test one’s judgments and make sure that one is not misjudging an effect or missing counter effects. I did that to the best of my ability in this analysis. For years, I’ve asked supply-siders to tell me any specific numbers or conclusions in my analysis that they disagree with. Alternately, I’ve asked them to post a link to one serious economic study that purports to show evidence of any income tax cut that has ever paid for itself. None have. So, until someone can provide me with a study or arguments that counter this analysis, I’ll just have to stick with the data.
Related articles
- Mulligan and Laffer (economistsview.typepad.com)
- Why History of Economic Thought Is Important: Whack-a-Mole Wall Street Journal/Arthur Laffer Edition (delong.typepad.com)
- This Might Be the Worst Ever Argument Against Government Stimulus (theatlantic.com)







There is a third, contrary effect in addition to income and substitution. If tax rates rise, people may say, “Gosh, in order to make the same take-home pay, I need to generate more income,” which is the incentive effect. This would tend to increase tax revenues even beyond the nominal rate increase. Thus, if taxes go from (for example) 10% to 15%, workers need to generate enough additional income to make up for the loss of 5% of their takehome pay. Any additional income is also taxed at 15%. This means that tax revenues not only increase by the amount of the rate increase, but also by the additional tax on the extra income.
This effect is particularly noteworthy when it is only the top marginal rate which increases. Workers who earn less than the cutoff for the top rate tend to have fairly static incomes, or at least, are in situations where they cannot arbitrarily decide to put in more hours or some such in order to generate more income. (That’s usually controlled by an employer.) On the other hand, people whose incomes are high enough that they are paying the top marginal rates probably can rejuggle their time and investments and efforts in order to generate additional income beyond what they’re now getting.
This means that raising the top marginal rate can generate more additional tax revenue than one would expect simply from the rate increase, because it furnishes an incentive for people in the top income layers to increase their income further, in order to make up for lost after-tax income. Since all of that additional earning would be taxed at the top marginal rate, this furnishes an additional windfall in tax revenue.
Note that this is contrary to the usual idea that higher taxes encourage people to work less, a concept which makes little sense. It is particularly true of people in the top tax brackets, that are generally highly motivated to have more after-tax money (which is why they engage in the “avoidance/evasion” mentioned in the article). They don’t stop wanting more after-tax money when the rates go up.
It is telling that Laffer doesn’t think highly of such things as “the econometrics and the data”. That should tell us a lot about where he’s coming from. And if indeed “CPA firms” and “financial planners” also make recommendations based on theology rather than “the econometrics and the data”, this could explain why the world economy crashed in 2008.