Posts tagged Health care

Smoke Screen

113

Duck and Uncover

This week, the Susan G. Komen Foun­da­tion, one of the best-​​funded, most vis­i­ble, and most pow­er­ful orga­ni­za­tions gath­er­ing money for breast can­cer treat­ment, research and screen­ing, stepped in a big pile o’ poo when they changed their grant appli­ca­tion rules in such a way to rather point­edly exclude Planned Parenthood.

Planned Par­ent­hood is not the Komen Foundation’s biggest prob­lem, though. As you’ll see shortly, they spend their money on feel-​​good projects, rather than using evidence-​​based med­i­cine to deter­mine who will be funded. In fact, there are sev­eral instances where Komen part­ner­ships have been detri­men­tal to women’s breast health. They have always made their deci­sions based on pol­i­tics and appear­ances, not what’s best for women.

The move to bar Planned Par­ent­hood was in response to anti-​​abortion groups, who objected to Planned Parenthood’s fund­ing of abor­tions. The media frenzy exposed some­thing that many in the med­ical and research com­mu­nity have known for some time: health care is polit­i­cal, and the Susan B. Komen Foun­da­tion is heav­ily staffed with peo­ple who iden­tify with con­ser­v­a­tive pol­i­tics. Most attrib­uted the cur­rent cri­sis to the hir­ing of Senior Vice Pres­i­dent for Pub­lic Pol­icy Karen Han­del nine months ago.

Ms. Han­del describes her­self in her Twit­ter pro­file as a “Life­long Con­ser­v­a­tive Repub­li­can” and for­mer Geor­gia Sec­re­tary of State. She would seem to be well-​​suited to a role involv­ing cri­sis man­age­ment for a large, high-​​profile national orga­ni­za­tion. (more…)

Burning Down the House

135

In this House, the M.D. doesn’t stand for More Debt

Here we are, two busi­ness days away from the hard ceil­ing on the debt limit, after blow­ing through the acoustic tiles a cou­ple of months ago. And yet, there’s no passed increase in the debt ceil­ing. The House is sup­posed to be vot­ing on their bill as we post this. It’s not clear that the House alone can pass a bill on the debt, let alone the House, Sen­ate, and Pres­i­dent together.

It’s fine to make a state­ment via one’s votes, or to grand­stand in a debate. That’s the polit­i­cal side of gov­ern­ment, and it’s a nec­es­sary part of get­ting peo­ple involved in the dis­cus­sion. But, at the end of the day, government’s first job is to run the coun­try. The debate comes second.

Draw­ing on my House ref­er­ence above, it’s fine to remind an obese per­son who’s hav­ing a heart attack that they really need to diet. But per­haps the car­diopul­monary resus­ci­ta­tion is a lit­tle bit more impor­tant right now.

(more…)

A Cure for AIDS, But at What Cost?

0

A CD4+ T cell infected with human immun­od­e­fi­ciency virus (HIV/​AIDS). Source: http://​www​.pin​na​cle​tox​i​col​ogy​.com

This week’s sci­ence news is a rel­a­tively old story with a new twist: in the jour­nal Blood, sci­en­tists in Ger­many report a pos­si­ble “cure” for infec­tion with the human immun­od­e­fi­ciency virus (HIV), the virus which causes the dis­ease acquired immun­od­e­fi­ciency syn­drome (AIDS).

An Amer­i­can liv­ing in Ger­many became ill with the rare and unfor­tu­nate com­bi­na­tion of AIDS and leukemia. Doc­tors car­ried out a stan­dard, but rad­i­cal and dan­ger­ous, ther­apy to treat the leukemia: they destroyed his native immune sys­tem and replaced it with a new one trans­planted from another patient’s stem cells. As a result, it seems as though the HIV infec­tion has been com­pletely elim­i­nated from the patient’s body.

(more…)

I’m Not Stoopid

0

Vot­ers aren’t stu­pid. The world is just com­plex. Our soci­ety has gone far away from the days when we were expected to col­lect our own food from a food­shed that was walk­a­ble in under an hour. We are a soci­ety of spe­cial­ists, but being a spe­cial­ist doesn’t make one stu­pid. Rather, being spe­cial­ists makes us bet­ter at the things we do than we are at the things we don’t do.

So we sub­sti­tute trust rela­tion­ships for wide but shal­low exper­tise. If I’m sick, I see a doc­tor. These days, that’s often a spe­cial­ist, an even more spe­cial­ized job than merely being a doc­tor. We con­verse, and I ask ques­tions. I will make the final call on the treat­ment plan, but I don’t have the exper­tise to know if it’s the right plan. I didn’t go to med­ical school, but pre­sum­ably my doc­tor did. I have to trust that the infor­ma­tion I get from my doc­tor is accu­rate. If my doc­tor has a hid­den agenda, I can eas­ily be talked into treat­ment plans that would ben­e­fit my doc­tor at my expense. I also must work to keep an open mind in that con­ver­sa­tion, because what­ever biases I bring into the con­ver­sa­tion will impact my deci­sion, pos­si­bly to my detriment.

Our rep­re­sen­ta­tives in gov­ern­ment are nec­es­sar­ily polit­i­cal spe­cial­ists. Many of them are also spe­cial­ists in other fields. For instance, I know of a nearby school board pres­i­dent who is also a highly spe­cial­ized struc­tural engi­neer. If you need to know any­thing hav­ing to do with his par­tic­u­lar engi­neer­ing spe­cial­iza­tion, this is the man to see. So we have a gov­ern­ment made up of polit­i­cal spe­cial­ists, mixed with a some­what ran­dom smat­ter­ing of other specializations.

But we ask these rep­re­sen­ta­tives to vote on issues in areas in which they are not spe­cial­ists. They have a few choices to make at that point. They can vote how­ever the party lead­er­ship tells them to vote (thus get­ting advice solely from polit­i­cal spe­cial­ists). They can vote how­ever polls from their con­stituents dic­tate, or based on com­mu­ni­ca­tions from their con­stituents (thus get­ting advice from the “hive,” or the most moti­vated mem­bers of the “hive”). Or they can seek out advice from spe­cial­ists in the fields impacted by the leg­is­la­tion and vote based on the advice they get from those specialists.

Spe­cial­ists are nec­es­sary for an ever-​​increasing per­cent­age of vot­ing issues, for pre­cisely the same rea­son that spe­cial­ists have become nec­es­sary in an ever increas­ing per­cent­age of our daily life deci­sions. For this rea­son, we should be encour­ag­ing our rep­re­sen­ta­tives to seek out advice from spe­cial­ists in ever more areas. We, as vot­ers, should be doing the same.

But an odd thing has been hap­pen­ing with increas­ing fre­quency and inten­sity over the past decade. There is a grow­ing back­lash from the right against spe­cial­ists. Why is this?

I sug­gest it’s because many peo­ple feel that both spe­cial­ists and lib­er­als are call­ing vot­ers stu­pid. Some­times it’s overt. The upshot is that the mes­sage of “it’s a really com­pli­cated issue” has become syn­ony­mous in many vot­ers’ minds with “you’re too stu­pid to under­stand.” This fos­ters resent­ment of the specialists.

Let’s face it, if you went to a doc­tor and he told you “you’re too stu­pid to under­stand the treat­ment I’m pre­scrib­ing; just do it,” you’d prob­a­bly start look­ing for another doc­tor. If you went to a lawyer, and he told you “you’re too stu­pid to under­stand the law, so just accept this plea bar­gain,” you’d want a dif­fer­ent lawyer. So it should come as no sur­prise that the same thing is hap­pen­ing in politics.

Global warm­ing is com­pli­cated. Most of us are insuf­fi­ciently edu­cated to under­stand the entire mech­a­nism. This doesn’t mean we’re stu­pid, but it does mean we are forced to trust specialists.

Key­ne­sian eco­nomic pol­icy is com­pli­cated. Most of us are insuf­fi­ciently edu­cated to under­stand the entire mech­a­nism. This doesn’t mean we’re stu­pid, but it does mean we are forced to trust specialists.

Health care today is com­pli­cated. Most of us are insuf­fi­ciently edu­cated to under­stand the entire mech­a­nism. This doesn’t mean we’re stu­pid, but it does mean we are forced to trust specialists.

See a pattern?

So what hap­pens when you start attack­ing the very notion of field spe­cial­ists? You’re forced to devolve. If you con­clude that you can­not trust doc­tors, then you self-​​treat, and you’re devolv­ing to health care of a cou­ple cen­turies ago. If you con­clude that you can­not trust econ­o­mists, then you make poor eco­nomic deci­sions, and you’re devolv­ing to an econ­omy of a cou­ple cen­turies ago. If you con­clude that you can­not trust sci­en­tists, then you make poor sci­ence deci­sions, and you’re devolv­ing to tech­nol­ogy of a cou­ple cen­turies ago.

Vot­ers on the right are par­tic­u­larly well primed to accept the attacks on the notion of field spe­cial­ists. With every pass­ing year, more and more are hear­ing the mes­sage that the left thinks they’re too stu­pid. Why on earth would you vote for or with peo­ple who think you’re too stu­pid to make deci­sions? So when the Repub­li­can party started focus­ing on that mes­sage, begin­ning with Sarah Palin’s aw-​​shucks I’m-just-a-regular-guy per­sona attack­ing the “élites” (i.e., spe­cial­ists who make you feel dumb), there was an audi­ence ready to respond.

It’s a very shrewd strat­egy to win votes. But it’s hor­ri­bly destruc­tive to a trust rela­tion­ship that builds up over the course of a cen­tury. It takes less time and energy to destroy a trust rela­tion­ship than to build one, which makes this strat­egy dou­bly destructive.

When you under­mine trust in field spe­cial­ists, you nec­es­sar­ily destroy the foun­da­tion of our mod­ern econ­omy. It is exactly the strat­egy that the Tal­iban used, albeit with dif­fer­ent jus­ti­fi­ca­tion. But Afghanistan is a 19th cen­tury econ­omy, so it didn’t really cause devo­lu­tion there. Afghanistan has lit­tle to offer the rest of the world besides min­er­als and agri­cul­tural prod­ucts (opi­ates being the most prof­itable of them).

This isn’t all Palin’s fault. She was the spark, but many lib­er­als lay the kin­dling over a long time. How often have we heard lib­er­als call­ing con­ser­v­a­tives, rural peo­ple, and vot­ers in gen­eral stu­pid? I’ve seen it on this very site. It’s con­de­scend­ing, and it should come as no sur­prise that it’s a major turnoff to the recip­i­ents of the condescension.

I don’t have a good solu­tion for this. But the path we’re on scares the hell out of me. I don’t want to live in a place where spe­cial­ists are dis­trusted sim­ply for being specialists.

What do you think?

Liberty or Healthcare For All?

0

Last time I described how health care has a mix of com­po­nents, some per­fectly suited to insur­ance, some per­fectly suited to uni­ver­sal cov­er­age, some per­fectly suited to fee-​​for-​​service, and some that doesn’t fit well in any of those. So it would stand to rea­son that we could break the meth­ods of pay­ing for health care into sep­a­rate cat­e­gories, and apply the best pay­ment model to each. That is, for cat­a­strophic exter­nal and inter­nal events, we would expect peo­ple to buy tra­di­tional insur­ance. For chronic con­di­tions and elec­tive ser­vices, we would expect peo­ple to pay for every­thing on a fee-​​for-​​service model. For com­mu­ni­ca­ble dis­eases, we would have government-​​funded uni­ver­sal cov­er­age. We’d still have to fig­ure some­thing out for gen­eral main­te­nance, but it’s not unrea­son­able to have that be part of the cat­a­strophic inter­nal events cov­er­age, since it should be expected to off­set the costs of cat­a­strophic inter­nal events.

But let’s explore this fur­ther. The case isn’t as clear as it might seem from last week’s discussion.

Chronic con­di­tions come in two types, con­gen­i­tal and acquired. Acquired chronic con­di­tions do, in fact, have a cor­re­spond­ing form of insur­ance out there, albeit one few peo­ple inten­tion­ally carry. Dis­abil­ity insur­ance is an often over­looked part of Social Secu­rity, but some peo­ple carry sup­ple­men­tary dis­abil­ity insur­ance as well. For peo­ple of work­ing age, odds are sub­stan­tially greater of injury caus­ing inabil­ity to work than of death. Yet far more peo­ple of work­ing age buy life insur­ance than buy dis­abil­ity insur­ance.

In any case, we had some spir­ited dis­cus­sion about what trade­offs we’re will­ing to make in order to pro­duce an ideal sys­tem. Not a sin­gle per­son sug­gested that we should give up uni­ver­sal cov­er­age of com­mu­ni­ca­ble dis­eases, or emer­gency care access to all, regard­less of abil­ity to pay. This could be an arti­fact of the more lib­eral lean of the site, but we do have con­ser­v­a­tives who par­tic­i­pate as well. For the pur­poses of today’s arti­cle, though, I’ll assume that we are in uni­ver­sal agree­ment of the need for both uni­ver­sal cov­er­age of com­mu­ni­ca­ble dis­eases, and uni­ver­sal emer­gency care, regard­less of finances.

Emer­gency care access to all is in con­flict with the notion of vol­un­tary cat­a­strophic health insur­ance. That is, the notion of emer­gency care access to all is more in line with uni­ver­sal cov­er­age, like fire pro­tec­tion ser­vices, while cat­a­strophic health cov­er­age aligns with tra­di­tional insur­ance. Just as mix­ing fire pro­tec­tion cov­er­age with uni­ver­sal fire­fight­ing ser­vices causes over­cov­er­age, so, too, does mix­ing emer­gency care access to all with cat­a­strophic health insur­ance. Those of us who have health insur­ance are cov­ered not only via the insur­ance pol­icy, but also via our taxes; we’re overinsured.

In addi­tion, since emer­gency treat­ment is often avoid­able through lower-​​cost gen­eral main­te­nance, it is in the best finan­cial inter­est of those who cover emer­gency treat­ment to also cover gen­eral main­te­nance. So we’re not only overin­sured, but we’re over­pay­ing in taxes for the oth­er­wise uninsured.

What about chronic con­di­tions? At the very least, we should have health insur­ance poli­cies avail­able to us that are sim­i­lar to dis­abil­ity insur­ance, in that they cover onset of chronic con­di­tions. I’ve looked for such med­ical insur­ance, but it doesn’t exist. In fact, health insur­ance providers instead drop indi­vid­ual cov­er­age for the very peo­ple who develop these chronic con­di­tions. Worse yet, once these peo­ple are dropped, they can never be cov­ered for it in the future. So what we have today is sim­i­lar to the case where an insurer col­lects pre­mi­ums on dis­abil­ity insur­ance, but refuses to make the monthly pay­ments when the insured became dis­abled. Yet, inter­est­ingly enough, the bulk of med­ical costs come from chronic con­di­tions, which is per­haps why the lead­ing cause of bank­ruptcy in the United States is med­ical costs.

Fur­ther­more, untreated chronic con­di­tions (e.g., dia­betes or asthma) result in sub­stan­tial, fre­quent inter­nal cat­a­strophic med­ical care. So it is finan­cially in the best inter­est of insur­ers of inter­nal cat­a­strophic med­ical care to also cover chronic con­di­tions. Yet again, those of us with health insur­ance are overin­sured, and over­pay­ing in taxes for the oth­er­wise uninsured.

In other words, if we assume that we want emer­gency care access to all, it is eco­nom­i­cally the most sen­si­ble to have uni­ver­sal cov­er­age for inter­nal and exter­nal cat­a­strophic care, com­mu­ni­ca­ble dis­ease cov­er­age, gen­eral main­te­nance, and chronic con­di­tions. To do oth­er­wise is to cost us all more; uni­ver­sal cov­er­age of cat­a­strophic med­ical care leads to a choice between uni­ver­sal cov­er­age of all non-​​elective ser­vices or pay­ing more money to not cover the other cat­e­gories of med­ical care.

We’re left with a deci­sion not of what to cover, but rather how to cover it. Com­pe­ti­tion among insur­ers can be ben­e­fi­cial as a means of increas­ing effi­ciency, pro­vided a min­i­mum bar of cov­er­age is estab­lished to ensure that the finan­cial bur­den doesn’t fall on tax­pay­ers to han­dle emer­gency care access to all. In short, as long as we have tax­pay­ers foot­ing the bill for uni­ver­sal emer­gency care, tax­pay­ers have a vested inter­est in either fully fund­ing all non-​​elective med­ical ser­vices (elim­i­nat­ing health insur­ance alto­gether) or man­dat­ing a min­i­mum level of pri­vate insur­ance cov­er­age. The sim­plest approach would be to pro­vide a choice between buy­ing cov­er­age that meets or exceeds the min­i­mum bar, or pay­ing the gov­ern­ment an amount of money com­men­su­rate with the gap in cov­er­age that would oth­er­wise be paid by other taxpayers.

Such a min­i­mum bar would need to have cov­er­age for pre-​​existing con­di­tions, and pro­hi­bi­tions against the insurer drop­ping cov­er­age, which oth­er­wise would result in health care costs falling on taxpayers.

The above man­dates present a sig­nif­i­cant fis­cal dan­ger to lower-​​income fam­i­lies. Health insur­ance is expen­sive if we are to main­tain the life-​​at-​​all-​​costs level of ser­vice to which we have grown accus­tomed. To han­dle it in the same way we han­dle tra­di­tional forms of insur­ance, we need to charge every­one pre­mi­ums that are irre­spec­tive of income. For lower-​​income fam­i­lies, this would likely result in over half of all income being used for health cov­er­age. While this pre­vents the uncer­tainty of bank­ruptcy result­ing from unfore­seen cir­cum­stances, it rather causes cer­tain bank­ruptcy from health, hous­ing, and food costs per­ma­nently exceed­ing income. A sub­sidy for low-​​income fam­i­lies can over­come this, but at that point we’re play­ing a lot of finan­cial sleight of hand to dis­guise the shift to a progressive-​​tax model, where peo­ple pay based on income.

It should be clear by now that I’m describ­ing some­thing very close to the high-​​level design of the Patient Pro­tec­tion and Afford­able Care Act (PPACA). I have described, in broad brush strokes, how we ended up with this model in the legislation.

There is no eco­nomic rea­son for us to main­tain the employer-​​supplied med­ical insur­ance. So why aren’t we get­ting rid of it? Because, when sur­veyed, most peo­ple with employer-​​supplied med­ical insur­ance say that they want to keep it. There are sev­eral rea­sons for this, which I won’t go into here; the point is that it would have been polit­i­cally unpop­u­lar to force peo­ple to give up their employer-​​supplied med­ical insur­ance. This was the intent of the “if you like your insur­ance, you can keep it” mes­sage. But as much as it starts to sound nanny-​​state-​​like, I still want to get rid of employer-​​supplied med­ical insur­ance. The econ­o­mist in me rec­og­nizes that this is a sig­nif­i­cant source of inef­fi­cien­cies in our med­ical sys­tem, due to all of the dis­con­nects among the pay­ers, sup­pli­ers, and consumers.

So this is not the most effi­cient model, but it does amount to a com­pro­mise that is on one hand designed to limit the load on tax­pay­ers (at the point of care), while increas­ing the load on tax­pay­ers (at the point of insur­ance), and main­tain­ing the strangely pop­u­lar employer-​​supplied insurance.

What would I like to see? True open-​​market insur­ance, where employ­ers take the exist­ing insur­ance money and turn it into larger pay­checks, would be one rea­son­able option. I don’t like increas­ing com­plex­ity in the income tax code, but I can see how many would want this to come with a cor­re­spond­ing tax deduc­tion for med­ical pay­ments. I’ll save my income tax notions for another arti­cle. But open-​​market insur­ance would need to main­tain min­i­mum stan­dards designed to min­i­mize the tax­payer bur­den that comes along with uni­ver­sal coverage.

I am a fan of a pub­lic insur­ance option, pro­vided there is no thumb on the scale in terms of gov­ern­ment sub­sidy. That is, any pub­lic insur­ance would have to be fis­cally self-​​sufficient. I rec­og­nize that there are startup costs, and so there would need to be an ini­tial invest­ment, but the key word is invest­ment. Lend the money to the pro­gram, at mar­ket inter­est rates, with an ordi­nary mar­ket pay­off sched­ule, to be paid for by what amounts to an increase in pre­mi­ums. Beyond that, the pub­lic insur­ance ser­vice would have free reign to offer what­ever ser­vices it wishes, pro­vided all poli­cies meet or exceed the min­i­mum bar, and would be for­bid­den from receiv­ing sup­ple­men­tal gov­ern­ment funding.

Other than elim­i­na­tion of employer-​​funded insur­ance, and the pub­lic option, PPACA cov­ers pretty much every­thing I would ask for. The fea­tures most often decried by the right are, iron­i­cally, the fea­tures designed to pro­tect tax­pay­ers. The only way to get rid of those fea­tures and simul­ta­ne­ously pro­tect tax­pay­ers is to elim­i­nate uni­ver­sal emer­gency ser­vice.

So I leave you with a few ques­tions, as usual.

  • If you oppose the PPACA insur­ance man­date, does this mean that you also oppose pro­tect­ing tax­pay­ers, or do you oppose uni­ver­sal emer­gency service?
  • If you don’t want health insur­ance to be held to a min­i­mum bar, does this mean that you also oppose pro­tect­ing tax­pay­ers, or do you oppose uni­ver­sal emer­gency service?
  • If you agree with me that employer-​​supplied insur­ance is eco­nom­i­cally inef­fi­cient, how do we get to a coun­try that no longer has employer-​​supplied insur­ance, given its gen­eral popularity?
  • If you are one of the peo­ple who loves employer-​​supplied insur­ance, please explain why the sys­tem is worth the inef­fi­cien­cies that arise from it.
  • Finally, if you believe I’m set­ting up false choices, explain how they are false choices and what the real options are.

Health Insurance Isn’t Really Insurance At All

0

The health insur­ance sys­tem in the United States is bro­ken. But you already know that. What you may not real­ize is why it is not only bro­ken, but in many ways is not fix­able. At least not with­out chang­ing some of our fun­da­men­tal beliefs about how health insur­ance and our health care sys­tem should work.

To fully grasp this, let’s start by look­ing at insur­ance itself. Insur­ance exists because there are rare but ruinously expen­sive events that hap­pen to peo­ple at unpre­dictable times. The pur­pose of insur­ance is to spread the risk of those rare but ruinously expen­sive events across a large enough group of peo­ple and a long enough time that the cost per per­son per unit of time becomes bear­able. For most of the insured, this is a los­ing propo­si­tion. That is, even exclud­ing admin­is­tra­tive and profit costs, you are likely to spend more on insur­ance than you will receive in claims. The more cat­a­strophic and rarer the insured event, the more likely this is true.

And yet we buy insur­ance any­way, mostly because the cost to us of the rare event is so great that we are unwill­ing to accept the con­se­quences. This is com­pletely ratio­nal and expected behav­ior. There’s an entire arti­cle that can be devoted to a dis­cus­sion of how insur­ance relates to the spec­trum of peo­ple from risk-​​averse to risk-​​seeking, but that’s far more involved than nec­es­sary for this arti­cle. The Wikipedia arti­cle on risk aver­sion is quite good, though.

Now let’s look at health care. We treat it as if it were this mono­lithic beast, when in fact it con­sists of sev­eral loosely related sep­a­rate parts. I’ll describe them here, and you’ll see what I mean.

  • Cat­a­strophic exter­nal events: These are things like car crashes or earth­quakes caus­ing book­cases to fall on you. They’re essen­tially unpre­dictable, and the cases that mat­ter most require expen­sive med­ical attention.
  • Cat­a­strophic inter­nal events: These are things like aggres­sive can­cer or degen­er­a­tive dis­eases. These are, to vary­ing degrees, more pre­dictable than the cat­a­strophic exter­nal events, and many of these ben­e­fit from early diag­no­sis and treatment.
  • Chronic con­di­tions: Asthma and some types of dia­betes go here. Treat­ment of these is focused on the symp­toms, as the under­ly­ing dis­ease is not curable.
  • Com­mu­ni­ca­ble dis­ease: I’m not count­ing things like the com­mon cold. This is more about dis­eases for which treat­ment addresses the under­ly­ing dis­ease and/​or pre­ven­tion of acquir­ing the dis­ease in the first place.
  • Gen­eral main­te­nance: This includes both asymp­to­matic and symp­to­matic check­ups, where there is not a clear indi­ca­tion of a par­tic­u­lar dis­ease. Non-​​communicable infec­tions and minor com­mu­ni­ca­ble dis­eases like the com­mon cold also apply here. Basi­cally, this is the stuff for which you go to a Gen­eral Practitioner.
  • Elec­tive ser­vices: Most cos­metic surgery falls under this cat­e­gory, but so do a few other things. There’s room for dif­fer­ences of opin­ion on many of these, such as gas­tric bypass.

One prob­lem with insur­ing health­care is the notion of a total loss. In tra­di­tional insur­ance, there is a known max­i­mum value for an event. In the case of auto­mo­bile insur­ance, there is a max­i­mum lia­bil­ity in the pol­icy, and col­li­sion will cover a max­i­mum of the cur­rent value of the vehi­cle, at which point it is con­sid­ered a “total loss.” Health insur­ance has attempted to accom­plish a sim­i­lar result with life­time caps (which are no longer legal). But peo­ple are under­stand­ably squea­mish about assign­ing a dol­lar value to their lives. Nobody wants to be told that they or their loved ones are going to die due to a lack of money. This imme­di­ately changes the insur­ance equa­tion, because pre­mi­ums need to be sig­nif­i­cantly higher if the poli­cies have no caps on claims.

Another prob­lem with insur­ing health care is most of the above cat­e­gories don’t all fit well with the tra­di­tional notions of insur­ance. Cat­a­strophic exter­nal events are the only sort of sit­u­a­tions for which clas­sic insur­ance is a per­fect match. Gen­eral main­te­nance would be silly to cover in the case of auto­mo­bile insur­ance (imag­ine insur­ance cov­er­ing oil changes), but for cat­a­strophic inter­nal events, the cost to the insurer is often sig­nif­i­cantly lower if dis­cov­ered early, which means that it’s less expen­sive to cover gen­eral main­te­nance if it results in early dis­cov­ery of cat­a­strophic inter­nal events. But gen­eral main­te­nance will rarely uncover these cat­a­strophic inter­nal events, so most of the money spent on gen­eral main­te­nance goes to areas not typ­i­cally asso­ci­ated with insurance.

Of course, full cov­er­age of gen­eral main­te­nance with­out co-​​pays tends to lead to the insured overus­ing med­ical ser­vices. If it’s free, there’s lit­tle incen­tive to err on the side of fru­gal­ity. On the other hand, hav­ing co-​​pays tends to lead to the insured under­us­ing med­ical ser­vices. Since many dis­eases are much less expen­sive to treat when they’re either asymp­to­matic or mildly symp­to­matic, peo­ple with co-​​pays are more likely to remain undi­ag­nosed until the dis­ease has pro­gressed beyond the cheap-​​and-​​easy-​​to-​​treat stage. Since most Amer­i­cans aren’t doc­tors, and since med­i­cine is so com­plex today, few of us are able to ade­quately deter­mine the ideal time to see doc­tors for diag­no­sis and treat­ment. Basi­cally, gen­eral main­te­nance is simul­ta­ne­ously well-​​suited and poorly-​​suited to insurance.

Chronic con­di­tions and elec­tive ser­vices are badly matched to insur­ance. Chronic con­di­tions tend to have rel­a­tively pre­dictable costs, which are fairly con­stant over time (think asthma inhalers or birth con­trol pills). Elec­tive ser­vices are, by their very nature, entirely pre­dictable, since they are entirely con­trolled by the per­son receiv­ing the ser­vices. The nec­es­sary over­head of insur­ance makes cov­er­age of chronic con­di­tions and elec­tive ser­vices more expen­sive than sim­ply pay­ing out of pocket. But many types of elec­tive ser­vices are hard to dis­tin­guish from nec­es­sary treat­ments. At what point does recon­struc­tive surgery become elec­tive, for example?

Com­mu­ni­ca­ble dis­eases are worth­while to insure against, but work best when every­one is cov­ered. This is the same sort of sit­u­a­tion as we have with fire pro­tec­tion (not fire insur­ance). Just as it is less expen­sive to put everyone’s fires out as quickly as pos­si­ble than to have patch­work cov­er­age, where some peo­ple are cov­ered and oth­ers not, it is less expen­sive (and causes fewer deaths) to con­trol com­mu­ni­ca­ble dis­eases as quickly as pos­si­ble than to treat some peo­ple and leave oth­ers untreated. For com­mu­ni­ca­ble dis­eases, then, the best model is not insur­ance in the tra­di­tional sense, but rather uni­ver­sal cov­er­age. Often these dis­eases are diag­nosed at gen­eral main­te­nance appoint­ments, fur­ther cloud­ing the appro­pri­ate­ness of gen­eral main­te­nance coverage.

So, some health­care is well suited to indi­vid­ual poli­cies, some to uni­ver­sal cov­er­age, and some to no cov­er­age at all. And not all sit­u­a­tions fall neatly into a sin­gle cat­e­gory, as evi­denced by the blee­dover between cat­a­strophic inter­nal and main­te­nance. Already it’s a mess. But it gets worse.

By far, the major­ity of Amer­i­cans get their health insur­ance from their employ­ers. This means that they have lit­tle or no choice about the cov­er­age they receive, and from whom. Few of us have the lux­ury to choose our employer based on the specifics of the health insur­ance pro­vided, and even if we did we prob­a­bly would con­sider other fac­tors to be more impor­tant any­way. It’s silly to be in that posi­tion in the first place. Imag­ine if the food we were allowed to eat was deter­mined by the make of car we drive. Health cov­er­age and employ­ment are an equally absurd match, from a purely objec­tive per­spec­tive. I am aware of the his­tory behind it, but that hardly makes this model wor­thy of perpetuation.

Now, since most Amer­i­cans don’t get to choose their health insur­ance providers, this means the providers have lit­tle incen­tive to please the con­sumers of their prod­ucts. Instead, they need to please their con­sumers’ employ­ers, and these employ­ers’ needs may well be at odds with those of the insured. For exam­ple, an employer will typ­i­cally want employ­ees to be healthy, because healthy employ­ees are more pro­duc­tive than unhealthy ones. How­ever, once an employee has been diag­nosed with a ter­mi­nal degen­er­a­tive dis­ease, it is now in the best inter­est of the employer for the employee to not have the cov­er­age at all, and fur­ther­more to no longer be employed, because the employee has become a pure lia­bil­ity. Even an employee with, say, a child with mus­cu­lar dys­tro­phy would likely be a net lia­bil­ity to the employer.

In other words, we’re get­ting insur­ance for many things that aren’t well-​​suited to be insured, from com­pa­nies that don’t need to sat­isfy us, paid for by peo­ple whose inter­ests match ours, when they do, only by coin­ci­dence. Given that, it’s remark­able that our sys­tem works as well as it does!

And then we have some sce­nar­ios for which the cur­rent sys­tem is com­pletely use­less. For exam­ple, it has often been sug­gested from the right that young peo­ple (say, in their 20s) don’t need to be insured at all, or need only cat­a­strophic cov­er­age cou­pled with a Med­ical Sav­ings Account (MSA). This pre­sumes they will not be sub­ject to cat­a­strophic inter­nal events. Granted, the like­li­hood of a cat­a­strophic inter­nal event is rel­a­tively low, but what is our plan for those cases where they occur? As I noted above, some­one with catastrophic-​​only cov­er­age + MSA is unlikely to go for main­te­nance, which makes the prog­no­sis much worse and the cost much higher upon diag­no­sis of a cat­a­strophic ill­ness. Is a 22 year old going to be suf­fi­ciently well informed to decide the appro­pri­ate level of insur­ance? I’m not con­vinced any­one is, since humans are noto­ri­ously bad at gaug­ing risk. But those in their 20s are par­tic­u­larly unlikely to have the finan­cial where­withal to sur­vive even one such instance, fis­cally speaking.

So what do we need to do in order to fix this? Any­one who says they know the answer is either mis­in­formed or lying to you. There is no per­fect solu­tion, because med­i­cine today is more com­plex and expen­sive than ever before, and we must make some hard choices. No mat­ter what, we have to give up at least one of the following:

  • Emer­gency care for all, regard­less of abil­ity to pay
  • Max­i­miz­ing the finan­cial effi­ciency of med­ical care (i.e., most bang for the buck)
  • Uni­ver­sal cov­er­age against com­mu­ni­ca­ble diseases
  • Afford­able coverage
  • Cov­er­age of all treat­ments, regard­less of cost

What we’re left with is a choice of which of those bul­lets are most impor­tant. This is where the dis­cus­sions should start, because which fea­tures you choose will quickly lead to the opti­mal solu­tion for that set of features.

One issue we have as a nation is an inabil­ity to have hon­est trade­off dis­cus­sions. Often, the con­ver­sa­tions devolve based on an assump­tion that there is an easy way out, that there is so much money being wasted that we can get every­thing we want if we just focused on improved effi­ciency. From per­sonal expe­ri­ence, I have never seen some­one present that argu­ment with­out being intel­lec­tu­ally lazy about it. That is, when pressed to explain pre­cisely where the inef­fi­ciency resides, the amount of waste described is always orders of mag­ni­tude smaller than the amount needed in order to close the fis­cal gap between where we are and where they want us to be.

For exam­ple, tort reform> is often, espe­cially from the right, described as a way of elim­i­nat­ing much waste from health care. But mal­prac­tice insur­ance costs have not risen over the past cou­ple of decades, and elim­i­na­tion of all mal­prac­tice judg­ments (which I can’t imag­ine any­one endors­ing) would reduce our med­ical expenses by only 2%. Sim­i­lar issues arise when the left points the fin­ger at insur­ance com­pany prof­its. I’m not argu­ing that these aren’t worth look­ing at, but they are very, very small com­pared to the rise in health care costs over the past decade.

Sim­i­larly, what is com­monly referred to as “defen­sive med­i­cine” is far less tied to mal­prac­tice costs than it is to the “Cov­er­age of all treat­ments, regard­less of cost” bul­let point. We want to make sure noth­ing is missed, and our doc­tors know this. Defen­sive med­i­cine is the nat­ural result when the direct cost to us, the con­sumers of med­ical ser­vices, is low rel­a­tive to the actual cost of the test­ing (because insur­ance picks up most or all of the tab), and doc­tors want to keep us happy as patients, and doc­tors don’t lose any money if patients have more tests. The “sys­tem” (usu­ally our employ­ers, ulti­mately) bears the bulk of the costs, and we as patients get all of the ben­e­fits. Is this some­thing we want to change? I know a cou­ple of peo­ple who, due to defen­sive med­i­cine, were diag­nosed with can­cer. Nei­ther would have been cor­rectly diag­nosed with­out the defen­sive test­ing. Both of them would have died if they weren’t diag­nosed until they were suf­fi­ciently symp­to­matic. While I rec­og­nize that this is anec­do­tal, I can’t help but won­der if any of us are so firm in our beliefs about cost reduc­tion in health­care that we are will­ing to die for those beliefs.

I’ll dis­cuss pos­si­ble solu­tions, and the Patient Pro­tec­tion and Afford­able Care Act (com­monly referred to as the “Health Care Reform Bill” or pejo­ra­tively as “Oba­maCare”) in par­tic­u­lar, in a future arti­cle. In the mean­time, I’ll leave you with a few questions:

  • Which of the five bul­let points are you will­ing to do with­out, and why?
  • Are you will­ing to accept fewer tests in exchange for lower insur­ance pre­mi­ums, but at a cost of higher risk of death?
  • If you see inef­fi­cien­cies in the sys­tem today, which ones are big enough to make a seri­ous dent in the cost of med­ical care in the US if we addressed them?
  • Which of the cat­e­gories of med­ical care should be pro­vided by health insur­ance, and why?
  • Do you think health insur­ance should be pro­vided by employ­ers at all? Why or why not?
Go to Top